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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE 
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND 
MORRISON 
Ronald D. Rotunda* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Morrison 1-
which invalidated parts of the Violence Against Women Act on 
federalism grounds-is one of the most significant Commerce 
Clause decisions in recent years for several reasons. 
First, the majority opinion illuminates and clarifies the 
Court's view of the scope of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause. The Court articulates, with a little more precision than 
before, the limits on what is "Commerce among the States." 
Morrison accepts broad federal power when Congress regulates 
activities (even noncommercial activities) that cross state lines or 
use the channels of interstate commerce. Thus, it signaled ap-
proval of the portions of the Violence Against Women Act that 
federalize "crimes committed against spouses or intimate part-
ners during interstate travel, "2 and portions that regulate the 
"channels of interstate commerce-i.e., the use of the interstate 
transportation routes through which persons and goods move. "3 
But when Congress uses the aggregation theory-adding up 
or aggregating a series of individual acts that together "affect" 
commerce among the states, if the activity regulated neither 
crosses a state line nor uses a channel or instrumentality of inter-
state activity-then the activity must have a "commercial charac-
ter."4 It must affect "commerce." Morrison, in short, tells us 
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
1. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
2. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 43 (1993). The provision is codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2261(a)(1), and the Morrison Court approves of it at 529 U.S. at 613-14 n.5. 
3. United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1999), quoted with ap-
proval in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 n.5. 
4. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4 (emphasis added). 
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that Congress may not aggregate a series of noncommercial ac-
tions (such as carrying a gun near a school) in order to reach the 
conclusion that those actions affect "commerce." 
Second, Morrison undercuts the argument that the Court 
should abdicate its role in federalism cases on the grounds that 
states can protect themselves.5 This argument is treated as ir-
relevant because the entire Morrison Court (both the majority; 
and the dissene) recognized that the doctrine of enumerated 
powers and the principles of federalism are designed, for the 
most part, to protect individuals not the states. Even Justice 
Breyer's dissent in Morrison acknowledged that the purpose of 
federalism and the purpose of the doctrine of enumerated pow-
ers are to protect individual liberty: 
No one denies the importance of the Constitution's federalist 
principles. Its state/federal division of authority protects lib-
erty-both by restricting the burdens that government can 
impose from a distance and by facilitating citizen participation 
in government that is closer to home. 8 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, agreed. The "Framers 
crafted the federal system of government so that the people's 
rights would be secured by the division of power."9 
The Framers of our Constitution anticipated that a self-
interested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose 
more federal control over the people and the states.10 Hence, 
they created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by 
dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted federal-
5. The Court relied on institutional restraints to protect federalism interests in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1976). In that line of cases, how· 
ever, all the Justices agreed that the matters were within the Commerce Clause. The 
only issue was whether the interests in state sovereignty placed some limits on federal 
power to regulate matters that were within interstate commerce. 
6. 529 U.S. at 613-17, nn.5-7. 
7. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J. dissenting), discussed below. See 
also Ginsburg, J., dissenting, in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995). 
8. 529 U.S. at 655 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter 
and Ginsburg joined only Part 1-A of the Breyer dissent, and this quotation comes in an 
introductory, unnumbered section, shortly before Part 1-A. Hence, Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg may not have joined this introductory portion. 
9. ld. at 617. 
10. See William T. Mayton, "The Fate of Lesser Voices": Calhoun v. Wechsler on 
Federalism, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1083 (1997) (quoting Calhoun); cf. John C. Yoo, The 
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311 (1997). 
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ism chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not the 
"states qua states. "11 
The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central 
government of enumerated powers. They divided power be-
tween the state and federal governments, and they further di-
vided power within the federal government by splitting it among 
the three branches of government, and they further divided the 
legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by 
splitting it between two Houses of Congress.12 
Morrison is significant for a third reason-the rationale of 
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer. That sharply worded dissent is the focus of this 
analysis. 
The four dissenters accused the Court of ignoring prece-
dent-a charge that is hardly unusual for a dissent. However, 
what is noteworthy in this case is that it is the dissent itself that 
seeks to overturn a long line of precedent. For the first time in 
two centuries, these four Justices would hold that the scope of 
federal power under the Commerce Clause is a political ques-
tion. While the majority considers the Commerce Clause to be a 
major enumerated power subject to a few limitations, the dissent 
treats the Commerce Clause as a general power, not subject to 
any judicial review. This dissent, in effect, treats the other enu-
merated powers as surplusage. 
This effort by four Justices to apply the political question 
doctrine to federal Commerce Clause questions and treat them 
as nonjusticiable is a major break with precedent. To under-
stand the significance of this endeavor, we first must turn to the 
parameters of the Violence Against Women Act, which Con-
gress passed with the best of intentions and which the Court 
(also with the best of intentions) invalidated as beyond federal 
power. 
11. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1976), overruled in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court 
spoke in terms of federalism used to protect the states. E.g. "The Act, speaking directly 
to the States qua States, requires that they shall pay all but an extremely limited minority 
of their employees the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress." But in Mor-
rison, the Court recognized that the real purpose of federalism is to protect the people by 
dividing authority between the federal and state governments. 
12. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 n.7. 
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THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACf 
In United States v. Morrison, the Court-by a vote of five to 
four-invalidated section 13981 of title 42Y This provision cre-
ated a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated 
violence. The law was popularly called "The Violence Against 
Women Act," although the sex-neutral text of the statute (which 
only refers to "persons") never mentions the sex of the victim: 
A person (including a person who acts under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) 
who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and 
thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) 
of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action 
for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, in-
junctive and declaratorr, relief, and such other relief as a court 
may deem appropriate. 4 
State laws, of course, already criminalize violence whether 
or not the perpetrator is motivated by gender. The new federal 
law did not preempt such state laws. Instead, it defined a "crime 
of violence motivated by gender" as "a crime of violence com-
mitted because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at 
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender. "15 This 
law did not require a prior criminal conviction or even a prior 
criminal complaint. The civil plaintiff could file his or her cause 
of action in either state or federal court.16 
Congress made extensive factual findings to show that the 
violence affects commerce, but the Court ruled that they were 
irrelevant to the constitutional analysis under the Commerce 
Clause. The Court concluded that sexual assaults-in the aggre-
gate-do not "affect" commerce among the states because the 
aggregation doctrine does not apply to the effects of noncom-
mercial conduct. 
In Morrison, the plaintiff sued two persons who allegedly 
assaulted and repeatedly raped her. She could have sued in state 
court for the common law tort of assault and battery, but she 
chose to sue using section 13981. She selected a federal forum 
(although the federal law also authorized her to sue in state 
court, even though she was relying on a federal statute). 17 
13. Id. at 598. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000). 
15. ld. § 13981(d)(1). 
16. ld. § 13981(e)(3). 
17. Id. § 13981(e)(3) provides that federal and state courts "shall have concurrent 
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The major issue before the Court was whether this law was 
within the Commerce Clause given the earlier decision in Lopez 
v. United States. 18 In that case, a 12th grade student had carried a 
concealed handgun in a San Antonio high school. This act of 
carrying the gun already violated state law, but the Federal Gov-
ernment prosecuted him under federal law, the Gun-Free Zones 
Act of 1990. The Court overturned the conviction and held that 
this action was not in interstate commerce. The government had 
to prove some connection with interstate commerce. It was not 
sufficient for the government merely to prove that the student 
carried the handgun.19 
The Morrison majority invalidated the Violence Against 
Women Act, emphasizing that it was like the law in Lopez be-
cause it did not regulate an economic or commercial activitfO 
and did not have any other nexus with interstate commerce. For 
example, it did not regulate something that had crossed state 
lines or was an instrumentality of interstate commerce.Z1 Earlier, 
in Perez v. United States/2 the Court had upheld a loan-sharking 
law. But, said the Court, that was different: loan-sharking is an 
extortionate credit transaction, and loan-sharking is a commer-
cial crime. Lending money is a "commercial" activity. Sexual 
battery is an unusually offensive crime, but it is not a commercial 
crime?3 
Undoubtedly crime, any crime, imposes costs on society. 
Crime affects national productivity, and, when one aggregates 
the costs of individual crimes, from purse-snatching to assaults 
(whether gender-motivated or not), one might conclude that 
they all affect commerce. Another way of rephrasing that argu-
ment is to assert that, in modern times, when we measure dis-
tances by time rather than miles (Los Angeles is only a few 
jurisdiction." 
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
19. Ronald D. Rotunda, Cases Refine Definition of Federal Powers, 17 Nat'! L.J. 
C9, C12 (July 31, 1995). 
20. 529 U.S. at 612-13. 
21. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that proof 
was required that a firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce to satisfy the re· 
quired nexus between possession and commerce). 
22. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). The Court upheld Title II of the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, which forbade extortionate credit transactions. Only Justice Stewart dissented, 
on the grounds that there was no proof of interstate movement, use of the facilities of 
interstate commerce, or facts showing that the defendant's conduct affected interstate 
commerce. 
23. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613: "Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity." 
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hours from Chicago; one can travel from New York to London 
on the overnight airline shuttle), everything is "commerce among 
the states" and we no longer have a government of limited or 
enumerated powers. 
Under that theory, the Commerce Clause reaches every-
thing, including barroom brawls. The Court has never accepted 
that argument in two centuries,24 and all nine Justices in Lopez 
explicitly rejected it. The majority acknowledged that, "[i]n a 
sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an 
ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet 
said the commerce power may reach so far."25 Similarly, Justice 
Breyer's Lopez dissent, which Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg joined, agreed that there are limits to the Commerce 
Clause. Although the dissent-at this point in the development 
of the case law-disagreed with the Lopez majority as to where 
to draw the line, all nine Justices agreed that there was a line 
and, ultimately, the judiciary will draw it. 
Justice Breyer's Lopez dissent clearly disagreed with the ar-
gument that the Court should abdicate any role. He acknowl-
edged that there are limits to the reach of the Commerce Clause 
and that the Court must decide where they are. Indeed, in one 
intriguing paragraph, he suggested what some of these limits 
might be. He stated that, given the important limits on the 
Commerce Clause, Congress could not regulate "any and all as-
pects of education": 
To hold this statute constitutional is not to "obliterate" the 
"distinction between what is national and what is local," nor is 
it to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal 
Government to "regulate any activity that it found was re-
lated to the economic productivity of individual citizens," to 
regulate "marriage, divorce, and child custody," or to regulate 
any and all aspects of education.26 
His choice of examples was interesting, because there is a cabi-
net level U.S. Department of Education and federal statutes and 
agency rules already regulate many aspects of education, from 
test taking to school lunch programs.27 
24. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935), 
where Cardozo, J., concurring, objects to the "view of causation that would obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce." 
25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580. 
26. ld. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
27. E.g., June Kronholz, Bringing Accountability to Schools Could Be Tough, Wall 
Street Journal A24 (Jan. 23, 2001). 
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Though Justice Breyer did not explain what federal re-
quirements on education, or economic productivity, or family 
law would be invalid, the important point is that he (and the 
other three Justices who joined his dissent) acknowledged that, 
at some point, the Court would draw the line. These four Jus-
tices disagreed with the other five as to where to draw the line 
but they all agreed that there is a line and the Court must draw 
it. After all, if the commerce power encompassed everything, 
then the considerable powers that are already enumerated in Ar-
ticle I, section 8 (such as the war power) are unnecessary, redun-
dant, and superfluous, just like the preceding repetitive syno-
nyms in this sentence. 
The dissent in Morrison is quite different from, and in fact 
repudiates, the dissent in Lopez. The four Justices who join this 
dissent are the same as in Lopez, but this time Justice Souter is 
the author. Souter does not explicitly repudiate the Breyer opin-
ion in Lopez but he advances a competing, diametrically op-
posed theory. What makes the Morrison dissent so unusual is 
that Justice Souter suggests that the Court should treat Com-
merce Clause questions as nonjusticiable, a political question. 
In contrast to Justice Breyer, who had agreed that there are 
limits to the commerce power and the only issue was whether 
the federal law at issue was within that power, Justice Souter re-
jects that framework and proposes complete judicial abdication: 
[The majority rejects] the Founders' considered judgment 
that politics, not judicial review, should mediate between state 
and national interests as the strength and legislative jurisdic-
tion of the National Government inevitably increased through 
the expected growth of the national economy.28 
Later, he reemphasizes this point: "[As to] supposed conflicts of 
sovereign political interests implicated by the Commerce Clause: 
the Constitution remits them to politics."29 
And yet again the dissent underscores its unusual invocation 
of the political question doctrine: 
Neither Madison nor Wilson nor Marshall, nor the Jones & 
Laughlin, Darby, Wickard, or Garcia Courts, suggested that 
politics defines the commerce power. Nor do we, even 
though we recognize that the conditions of the contemporary 
28. 529 U.S. at 647 (footnote omitted) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.). 
29. Id. at 649. 
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world result in a vastly greater sphere of influence for politics 
than the Framers would have envisioned. . . . If history's les-
sons are accepted as guides for Commerce Clause interpreta-
tion today, as we do accept them, then the subject matter of 
the Act falls within the commerce power and the choice to 
legislate nationally on that subject, or to except it from na-
tional legislation because the States have traditionally dealt 
with it, should be a political choice and only a political 
choice.30 
Note that the last half of this paragraph, after the ellipses, took 
back what the first half appeared to have conceded. 
The dissent purports to accept "history's lessons" as its 
guide, but that history does not suggest that the limitations on 
the Commerce Clause "should be a political choice and only a 
political choice." The lesson of history is the opposite. 
Consider, for example, Jones & Laughlin,31 one of the cases 
that Justice Souter cites. The Court did not purport to abdicate 
its role in adjudicating Commerce Clause issues. Instead, the 
Court explained why the federal law regulated commerce among 
the states. The New Deal Court rejected its earlier cases declar-
ing that "manufacturing" is not commerce. The manufacturing 
of steel is commerce, the Court now said. Transportation of 
steel across state lines is concededly commerce: "of what avail is 
it to protect the facility of transportation, if interstate commerce 
is throttled with respect to the commodities to be transported!"32 
If Chief Justice Hughes were holding that the entire issue 
was a political question, he could have written a much shorter 
opinion, used the phrase "political question," and wasted no 
time on whether "industrial strife would have a most serious ef-
fect upon interstate commerce. "33 On the contrary, he warned 
that the commerce power "must be considered in the light of our 
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to 
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and re-
mote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, 
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is na-
tional and what is local and create a completely centralized gov-
ernment. "34 
30. Id. at 651-52 n.19 (emphasis added). 
31. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
32. Id. at 42. 
33. Id. at 41. 
34. Id at 37. 
2001] COMMERCE CLAUSE 327 
Similarly, in United States v. Darby,35 if the Court thought 
the issue were a political question, one would think that it might 
mention the phrase. Congress decides how far to exercise its 
considerable commerce power, within that power's outer 
bounds, but the Court decides if the statute lies outside those 
bounds. 
In Wickard v. Filburn,36 which the majority in Lopez and 
Morrison had cited with approval, one wonders why Justice 
Jackson's opinion dwelt on why grain consumed on the farm af-
fects the amount of grain transported across state lines. Con-
sumption on the farm where the wheat is grown accounts for "an 
amount greater than 20 per cent of average production."37 
"Home-&rown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in com-
merce. "3 The Wickard Court did not blindly defer to Congress 
and did not abdicate its role on the decision as to whether some-
thing is within interstate commerce. Rather, it explained why 
transportation of wheat in commerce was "substantially af-
fected" by home-grown wheat-a relationship that the Court 
concluded was neither attenuated nor implausible. Wickard de-
ferred to .Congress' judgment only on the question whether it 
should exercise this power as broadly as it did, not on the ques-
tion whether the power was within the Constitution. 
One significant opinion that Justice Souter's dissent did not 
cite was that of Justice Hugo Black in Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States.39 That case upheld a federal law that pro-
hibited motels and hotels from discriminating on the basis of 
race. These businesses often served transient guests moving in 
interstate commerce. They bought food and other goods and 
services that had crossed state lines. The evidence supported the 
conclusion that hotels and motels advertised out-of-state and ac-
cepted many of their guests from out-of-state, but refused to 
serve racial minorities, who therefore found it more difficult to 
travel in interstate commerce. It was difficult for blacks to drive 
across the country because many private motels and restaurants 
refused to serve them. The "vacancy" sign turned into "no va-
cancy" when the black family sought a room. 
Justice Black was never a part of the pre-1937 Court that 
read the Commerce Clause narrowly. He had no crabbed view 
35. 312 u.s. 100 (1941). 
36. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
37. Id. at 127. 
38. ld. at 128. 
39. 379 U.S. 241, 268 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
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of federal power. Yet, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, his concurring 
opinion emphasized an important caveat: 
[T]he operations of both the motel and restaurant here fall 
squarely within the measure Congress chose to adopt in the 
Act and deemed adequate to show a constitutionally prohibi-
table adverse effect on commerce. The choice of policy is of 
course within the exclusive power of Congress; but whether 
particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently 
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regu-
late them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative ques-
tion, and can be settled finally only by this Court.40 
Though Justice Black's comments were labeled a concurring 
opinion, there was no hint in the other opinions that any of the 
Justices would reject his analris. Indeed, in the companion case 
of Katzenbach v. McClung,4 the majority explicitly states: "Of 
course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular ac-
tivity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude fur-
ther examination by this Court. "42 Justice Souter's dissent is ir-
reconcilable with McClung and Justice Black's concurring 
opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel. 
Perhaps Justice Souter is not arguing that all Commerce 
Clause issues are political questions. Souter may be saying that 
the reach of the Commerce Clause is determined solely by a sig-
nificant national economic effect, and hence that the Court's ef-
forts to carve-out an area of noncommercial activities and tradi-
tional areas of state concern are unwarranted. But such a 
criticism of the majority opinion would be off the mark. First, 
while the majority mentions that the activities that Congress 
seeks to regulate (carrying a gun near a school, a sexual assault, 
etc.) are areas that the states have traditionally regulated, the 
Court is not trying to create a list of activities that are part of 
"inherent" state sovereignty.43 Instead, the Court makes clear 
that Congress may always regulate that which crosses state lines 
or involves the channels of interstate commerce, even if states 
primarily or traditionally regulate those actions.44 
40. Id. at 273. 
41. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
42. Id. at 303. 
43. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Usery in the Wake of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission v. Mississippi, 1 Const. Comm. 901 (1984); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doc-
trine of Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 289 (1984). 
44. Less than a week after Lopez, the Court unanimously decided United States v. 
Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam). The Government prosecuted Juan Robert-
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Second, Souter may be arguing that if something is within 
the scope of the Commerce Clause as defined by national eco-
nomic effect, then the Court's role is at an end. In Souter's view, 
politics and not the Constitution, decides if Congress may regu-
late noncommercial activity that, in aggregate, affects the entire 
nation, because there is no principled basis for the Court to de-
cide if an activity is "noncommercial." But the distinction is an 
easy one. There conceivably may be cases where it is difficult to 
determine if an activity is "noncommercial," and such a case 
could test this theory, but that has not yet happened in over two 
centuries. As the Morrison majority pointed out, "thus far in 
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is eco-
nomic in nature. "45 The dissent was unable to undermine that 
conclusion. In "every case" where the Court has "sustained fed-
eral regulation under the aggregation principle in 317 U.S. 111 
(1942), the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial 
character. "46 
Lopez, as well, spoke of the noneconomic nature of the 
conduct at issue. The law invalidated does not "regulate[ ] a 
commercial activity."47 The statute "by its terms has nothing to 
do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms."48 Lopez, which did not 
overrule any prior case, assured us that, "[w]here economic ac-
tivity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regu-
son for various narcotics offenses and for violating a provision of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by investing proceeds of those unlawful 
activities in the "acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operations of, any 
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000). Robertson invested in a gold mine in Alaska. 
He was convicted on both the narcotics count and the RICO count, but the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the RICO count because the Government had failed to introduce sufficient evi-
dence that the gold mine was "engaged in or affect[ed] interstate commerce." Robertson, 
15 F.3d 862, 888 (1994). 
With no dissent, the Supreme Court reversed. It was unnecessary to consider 
whether the activities of the gold mine "affected" interstate commerce, because the "af-
fects" test or the "aggregation doctrine" is only necessary to "define the extent of Con-
gress' power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have substan-
tial interstate effects." Robertson, 514 U.S. at 671. In this case, there was proof that 
money, workers, and goods crossed state lines. The activities were no longer purely in-
trastate. For example, Robertson purchased at least some mining equipment in Califor-
nia that was transported to Alaska. Robertson transported $30,000 of gold (about 15% 
of the mine's total output) out of state. He also sought workers from out of state and 
brought them to Alaska. 
45. 529 U.S. at 613. 
46. Id. at 611. 
47. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
48. Id. at 561. 
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lating that activity will be sustained."49 The Lopez majority reaf-
firmed Wickard v. Filburn,50 and noted that it "involved eco-
nomic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school 
zone does not."51 The law in question is not even "an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity."52 
Souter's test as a practical matter leaves no genuine limit to 
the Commerce Clause. In the aggregate, every widespread activ-
ity has a national economic effect. His analysis, even limited to 
the aggregation theory, still makes the commerce power an 
unenumerated power. Recall that when people or things cross 
state lines or involve the instrumentalities or channels of inter-
state commerce, no one on the Court has a problem with a broad 
federal power.53 Why bother with using the theory of crossing a 
state line or using the instrumentalities or channels of interstate 
commerce? 
Hence, Justice Souter's dissent in Morrison, in rejecting Jus-
tice Black's view of the Commerce Clause, also rejects the 
Breyer dissent in Lopez. Yet, the same four Justices who em-
brace the Souter dissent are the same four Justices who join the 
Breyer dissent in Lopez. Only the main author is different. 
None of these Justices (Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens) 
explain, or even acknowledge, the inconsistency. The Breyer 
dissent in Lopez explicitly accepted the idea that the Federal 
Government is one of enumerated powers and that there are 
limits to the Commerce Clause, although it disagreed with the 
majority as to where to draw the line. In contrast, Justice Souter 
implicitly rejects the idea that the federal government is one of 
enumerated powers. Rather than disagreeing with the majority 
as to where the Court should draw the line, he explicitly objects 
to any role for the judiciary. 
His proposed abdication is the first time in two centuries 
that any of the Justices-in this case four of them-argued that 
there is no significant role for the judiciary in determining the 
metes and bounds of the Commerce Clause.54 Even in the pe-
49. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
50. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
51. 514 U.S. at 560. 
52. Id. at 561. 
53. See Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995). 
54. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) held 
that in general it is up to the political process to decide what are "integral state func-
tions" and when states should be immunized from federal regulation under the Com-
merce Clause. What the federal government regulated in that case, a city-owned mass 
transit system, is clearly interstate commerce, and federal regulation did not single out 
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riod from 1937 through Lopez, no Justice on the Court ever pro-
posed that the Court abdicate a judicial role. The Justices up-
held federal regulations, sometimes over dissents,55 but they 
never argued that the issue was a political question, like the deci-
sion to declare war, or the decision as to whether Congress has 
properly accepted a state's ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. 56 
Justice Souter would change all that, and reject both Justice 
Black's admonition and the Breyer dissent in Lopez. Souter 
urges judicial abdication, while simultaneously making the sur-
prising claim that it is the majority that rejects precedent.57 The 
Souter dissent also embraces a general federal police power that 
the courts (in his view) could not review, although the Framers 
and the representatives of the States at the time feared such a 
general police power. Because Breyer also joined the Souter 
dissent, one must assume that he too rejects his earlier opinion. 
Souter's position was a surprise to the Solicitor General, 
who agreed that the commerce power has limits and that 
whether a matter falls within them is a decision for the Court. 
The Solicitor General, in another case that same term, argued 
that if the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate "all 
activity that might have some indirect or remote downstream ef-
fect on interstate commerce," that would "improperly vest ple-
nary power in the national government."58 Later, he repeated 
the states for any special burdens. No Justice-in the majority or the dissent-argued 
that the question whether something is interstate commerce is not a judicial question. In 
fact, all nine 1 ustices agreed that the matter being regulated is interstate commerce, the 
same conclusion that all nine came to in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), which Garcia overruled. See Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After 
Garcia· Process-Based Procedural Protections, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev.1657 (1987). 
55. E.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal law govern-
ing extortionate credit transactions, a commercial crime, after reviewing congressional 
record; Stewart, J., dissented, arguing that the matter was not within the Commerce 
Clause). 
56. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Running Out of Time: Can the E.R.A. Be Saved, 64 
A.B.A.J. 1507 (1978). 
57. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, 1., dissenting). 
58. Brief of the United States at 12, Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (No. 
99-5739). Jones was another commerce clause case that the Court decided that same 
term, although this time the Court decided on statutory grounds, in order to avoid the 
Commerce Clause problem. 
In Jones, Justice Ginsburg, speaking for the Court, reversed and held that, as a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation, "an owner-occupied residence not used for any commer-
cial purpose does not qualify as property 'used in' commerce or commerce-affecting ac-
tivity; arson of such a dwelling, therefore, is not subject to federal prosecution under § 
844(i). Our construction of§ 844(i) is reinforced by the Court's opinion in United States 
v. Lopez, and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be 
avoided where possible." 529 U.S at 850-51 (internal citations omitted). See also Scar-
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this refrain: "If Congress were authorized to regulate all activity 
that could theoretically have some distant downstream effect on 
interstate commerce, its powers would be effectively unlim-
ited."59 The Souter dissent rejects the Solicitor's position. 
Morrison shows that the Court is serious about policing the 
commerce power. Congress still has considerable legislative 
power, but it will be more difficult for Congress to enact legisla-
tion that is "more appropriate to county commissions than to a 
national government."60 The law in Morrison created a federal 
tort that almost duplicated the state tort; the primary difference 
between the two was that the federal tort was more difficult for 
the plaintiff to use because it required proof of gender-based 
animus. 61 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers created federalism not simply or primarily to 
protect the states but to protect the people. The Court's New 
Federalism should not be confused with the old states' rights 
federalism, because the New Federalism is about freedom, not 
about Jim Crow laws. 
It is incorrect to conclude that Morrison shows that the pre-
sent Court is deferential to the states. On the contrary, taken in 
context, it shows quite the opposite. During the same term that 
the Court decided this important federalism case, it also invali-
dated a state law that intruded on the parental relationship by 
mandating grandparents' visitation rights.62 This same Court 
threw out state laws that interfered with federal power over in-
ternational affairs63 and motor vehicles.64 The Court upheld fed-
eral privacy laws that regulated state motor vehicle departments 
borough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), (holding that the Government must prove 
that a firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce in order to satisfy the required 
nexus between possession and commerce). 
59. Brief of the United States at 41, Jones (No. 99-5739). 
60. Former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, quoted in Mary Deibel, 
Court Cutting Federal Role, Chicago Sun-Times 35 (June 25, 1999). 
61. The arson law in Jones also duplicated state laws. It did not authorize one extra 
dollar to hire more FBI agents to investigate residential arsons. States already criminal-
ize arson and there was no suggestion that they needed federal help. If the law were in-
terpreted to apply to residential arson, that interpretation would be largely symbolic; it 
would serve the purpose of convincing voters that the Federal Government was against 
arson. 
62 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
63. Crosby v. Nat'/ Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
64. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
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and placed upon them the same restrictions imposed on private 
parties.65 The Court, in short, has shown that, when it is protect-
ing civil rights and liberties, it is willing to override state law to 
meet that goal. The present Court is neither conservative nor 
liberal on federalism issues. If we must find a label, the most ac-
curate one is libertarian because the Court invalidates laws, both 
state and federal, that interfere with our liberty. 
This "New Commerce Clause" does not prevent the Federal 
Government from enacting any commercial regulation with 
which the states would be incapable of dealing and that would be 
necessary for a central government to enact. Indeed, Morrison 
and its predecessors do not overturn any prior case law. But the 
significance of these cases should not be underemphasized be-
cause they reinvigorate first principles. 
Narrow majorities have decided these new Commerce 
Clause cases. Often when there is a string of five to four opin-
ions, at least one Justice in the majority waivers in the steadfast-
ness with which he or she adopts the legal principle. Not so in 
these cases. In all of them, the five-person majority-Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas and Ken-
nedy-acts as one. These precedents herald a greater protection 
for the structure of the federal system and for the liberty that 
this structure protects. 
Some people are concerned that this interpretation means 
that Congress cannot use section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to regulate private conduct and thereby "expand" 
civil rights. The concept of "expanding" human rights, like 
motherhood, apple pie, and the flag, sounds magnificent and 
wonderful. But it is like a knife that cuts both ways. If Congress 
could use such a ~ower to expand some rights, it may do so by 
narrowing others. 6 
Moreover, except for Morrison, these cases limit the com-
merce power, not the section five power. The fact that an activ-
65. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
66. It should not be difficult to draft creative legislation that recasts a simple dilu-
tion of one right as an expansion of another. A Congress bent on limiting desegregation, 
for example, would not simply enact a law authorizing states to establish racially segre-
gated schools. Instead, the law might provide-in an effort to "expand" freedom of 
choice- that states should establish a variety of schools and allow people to transfer to 
their preferred schools, even if the result of such transfers meant that some schools be-
came discriminatorily white or black. City of Boerne and its progeny prevent that result. 
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ity is not within the Commerce Clause does not mean that it is 
outside of the section five power.67 
Federalism is important because it is one of the structural 
designs that the Framers created to help preserve our liberty. 
The Commerce Clause is also important not only because it 
gives Congress great power, but also because it grants that 
power within limits. Thus, the majority in Morrison embraced 
the important principle that Justice Black earlier articulated in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States68 -"whether particu-
lar operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come 
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is 
ultimately a judicial rather than a le~islative question, and can be 
settled finally only by this Court. "6 In so doing, it soundly re-
jected Justice Souter's novel and unprecedented argument that 
Commerce Clause limits are nonjusticiable. 
Our federal structure is as old as our Constitution, but it is 
not outdated because it creates a framework that disperses 
power and increases liberty. If the people were angels we would 
not need a government, and if the governors were angels we 
would not need a Constitution. Alas, neither is true, so we need 
both.70 
67. Morrison did not create new law, for the Court had already held that section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment only allows Congress to enforce section 1, and section 1 
requires state action. Only two of the nine justices in Morrison argued that section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could justify this law. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of 
Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 
Ind. L. Rev. 163,170 (1998). 
68. 379 U.S. 241,268 (Black, J., concurring). 
69. ld. at 273. 
70. James Madison said in The Federalist Papers: "If men were angels, no govern-
ment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficult lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. Fed-
eralist 51 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 290 (Mentor, 1961). 
